New People’s Army and the Philippines: No end in sight?

Autor: Noriko Hashimoto

Originally Published at Peace and Conflict Monitor on 09/04/2009

40 years of conflict between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and New People’s Army (NPA), a communist rebel group, is still continuing. According to news reports from Reuters, some 40,000 people have been killed by this conflict since the foundation of NPA in 1969 (2008). NPA is the military sector of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP),which is based on Maoist philosophy and practices, has been attempting
to achieve a new democracy by conducting people’s war (guerrilla war). They have been spreading nationwide and are currently active in 69 of 81 provinces (Reuters 2008). GRP has been carrying out effort for peace, by initiating a
peace process. On the other hand, GRP has been shifting their policies toward rebels, including NPA. Unfortunately, the Philippines has not seen any improvements to the issue which was pointed out by rebels: the expanding gap between rich and poor. Accordingly, GRP lost NPA’s trust, and the peace process had made little progress.

As NPA, and the communist parties that NPA originated from have a long history, which had started before World War II, this paper focuses on the period of the former president Fidel Valdez Ramos and the current president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s administration. Although it is short-term observation, this period demonstrates the pattern of government policy toward NPA. While former president Ramos actively engaged in peace talks with rebels throughout his presidency, President Arroyo쳌fs commitment to the peace process changed after the events of September 11^th 2001, and has been inconsistent.

Challenges to the peace process have come not only from the GRP side, however, but also from the NPA side. This paper is an investigation of the key challenges to the peace process between GRP and NPA in the era of the former president Ramos and the president Arroyo. These challenges are: the fact that GRP is considered untrustworthy by NPA; the interests of foreign powers, which pressured GRP not to negotiate with communist, terrorists, and NPA’s structure, psychological pattern, and philosophy. 

1. Background of the conflict between GRP and NPA/CPP from before WWII until president Aquino

A good place to start is to trace the history of this conflict because it shows what kinds of memories GRP and NPA have. As far back as 1930, before WWII, the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (Communist Party of the Philippines; PKP), which is origin of CPP, was formed. The driving force behind rising communist parties was the increasing poverty among peasants and labors, and the parallel increase of wealth among landowners who received benefits during Spanish and American colonial time. Soon after foundation of PKP, in 1932, it was delegitimize and leaders were arrested by the government. However, it was legalized again in 1937.

During WWII, guerrilla groups were based on peasans’ resistance against imperial Japan. Armed group called Hukbalahap (Huks), had formed under PKP and had fought throughout the War against Japanese occupation. It had been seen that Huks and U.S. army worked with coalition to defeat Japan. After the War, leaders of Huks were elected in a national election but conservative landlords deprived their legislative seats receiving a boost from U.S. because U.S. was hostile towards communism and landlords feared to be violated their right of their lands by communists. The government had quelled them because of the pressure from the United States. By the mid-1950s they were completely suppressed, which meant the end of the first period of communist activism.

With increasing tension of mass movement in the background of Vietnam War, José María Sison, one of leaders of PKP, left his group because of its pro-Soviet Union ideology. Based on Maoism, CPP was founded and New People’s Army (NPA) was founded as a military sector of CPP. NPA is of the school of Huks, and the commander Dante of Huks became a founding member. Since 1972, during the Martial Law of Marcos administration, NPA had been damaged and their leaders had been arrested one after another, nevertheless in the 1980s they were at the peak of their history, News resources said there were an estimated 25.800 NPA soldiers (REUTERS, INQUIRE, 2008). At this time, NPA and CPP founded the National Democratic Front (NDF) which supports both NPA and CPP and they elevated their rhetoric toward GRP. Despite former president Aquino’s effort toward the national reconciliation after the Marcos dictatorship, the peace process was broken by the Armed Force of the Philippines (AFP). Although Aquino’s presidency had won the democracy from Marcos, it was a patched-together government and was not strong enough to complete the democratic transition. In fact, during Aquino, attempted military coups were reported several times. The peace process would have to wait until Ramos’ presidency to develop further.

2. Analysis

There are many factors which are disrupting to the peace process in the Philippines. Some of the most important factors are: the fact that GRP is considered untrustworthy by NPA because of their inconsistent policies and human rights violations; the interests of foreign powers, which pressured GRP not to negotiate with communist, terrorists, and NPA’s structure, psychological pattern, and Maoist philosophy. These issues make it difficult for the parties to this conflict to negotiate with each other.

2.1. Inconsistent Policy of GRP toward NPA

The pattern of shifting government’s policy has had a big impact on NPA, and makes confidence-building difficult. While the cabinet changes every presidential election, rebel groups rarely change their structure of organization and the leaders therefore maintain longer memory. NPA tends to think that a peace agreement will break down soon.

2.1.1. Peace effort during Ramos presidency; 1992-1998

To resolve armed conflict always become a major political issue each cabinet because it create significant obstacles to
economic progress. Economic policies that the successive presidents of the Philippines were same, especially the era of the former president Ramos was the Philippines was left behind other ASEAN countries. So it was absolute must and Ramos aimed to join NIEs until 2000. He attracted foreign companies to the economic district. His series of economic policies and peace process brought about substantial results, which made peace process successful.

Ramos presidency had started set of economic policy, in parallel yielded breakthrough in relations between GRP and NDF which was representative of CPP and NPA. Ramos’ effort for peace started from “The Hague Joint Declaration September 1992”, which happed soon after his assumption of the presidency. This Declaration confirmed both parties쳌f willingness for series of peace talks and negotiation to resolve armed conflict. Both parties had been building mutual trust through continued negotiation. From The Hague Joint Declaration, Series of official and unofficial peace talk and negotiation at the mediation of Norway government reached a framework, CARHRIHL (comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines) that had been signed by both parties in 1998. As long as no ceasefire agreement, CARHRIHL was consider not only as a regal document for human rights violation, but also as a way to build the confidence between both parties (Amnesty International Report 2007). These processes reined in violence, number of killing people by the battle between GRP and NPA during Ramos administration was diminished; GRP 2 and NPA 2 people were reported, compared to before and after Ramos presidency. According to the Philippines Human Development Report 2005, 735 government soldiers were killed in battles with rebels during Aquino’s presidency, while NPA lost 858 people. Although statistics should not be trusted completely, these numbers should be carefully considered, as they show much fewer deaths under Ramos.

Según La Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Philippines, the Era of Ramos’ presidency achieved economic growth on the order of 4.0% after 1994. This economic improvement must have had some effect on the number of battles. According to research by National Statistic Coordination Board, the GINI coefficient had been declining from 0.4881 to 0.4814 for 3 years, from 1997 to 2000, which statistic shows that the society moved toward more equal income distribution. However, economic development is not necessarily the case to resolve issue that rebel’s claim, improvement of poor in provinces. For rural poor, it may cause an increase in relative deprivation.

2.1.2. Peace effort of the President Arroyo; 2001-2007

Soon after taking office, President Arroyo restarted the peace process which was stuck during the era of the former president Estrada. Her early work was to reaffirm the GRP’s policy on the peace process, as the Ramos administration had done. On March 9^th 2001, both parties had reached joint statement which confirmed resumption of official negotiation two years after from its termination. Subsequently, a month after, April 27 to 30, both parties had conducted a working session in Oslo, Norway (Brillantes 2007 p 15-17). However, since last working session April 2001, negotiation had stopped. Resuming peace talks had to wait until January 2004. BBC News reported that the NPA negotiators were less optimistic and said: “We’d be lucky to complete 50% of the talks… but to finish it would not be possible”(BBC News,10 February, 2004). This interview was before the “Oslo Joint Statement”, held
February 14 2004. From this comment, there is an assumption: NPA showed their gesture that GRP is trustworthy using mass media. Even BBC News didn’t mention about their intention from this comment, it implied that comments to media can be used as a strategy to shoulder a burden to GRP before starting bargaining for NPA’s advantage. In the same year, finally JOINT MONITORING COMMITTEE, was agreed in CARHRIHL, had formed in 2004. Perhaps GRP’s gesture to showtheir response to NPA was late.

There is a question, why period of absence of peace talk had continued almost for 2 years. Reason of it is the pressure
from foreign countries. The Philippines’ policy of foreign diplomacy is affecting the peace process, especially their relationship with U.S. The Philippines is considered a “front line state” of U.S.-led international fight against terrorism. In April 2001, Arroyo administration had restarted peace process in Oslo, Norway. However, after September 11 2001, GRP had changed their policy toward NPA, and implemented “Oplan Bantaly Laya” (Operation Freedom Watch) which is an armed operation to counter the rebels (Human Rights Now, 2007 p8). Also GRP had been ignoring the fact that U.S. department of state placed the name of NPA in the Foreign Terrorist Organization Designations Table in 2002. European Union (EU) also had placed names of NPA and Sison on the list which designated them as terrorists. In addition, the Bush administration decided to provide $65 million US to the Armed Force of the Philippines (AFP) in the 2003 (Lum, Niksch 2006 p19). These series of events seriously affected NPA’s confidence in their relationship with the government. Arroyo’s presidency imposed a state of emergency nationwide in January 2006, next year continuously “TEN-POINT AGENDA TO BEAT THE ODDS IN SIX YEARS UNDER THE ARROYO ADMINISTARATION” was declared, which is a political statement that President Arroyo’s presidency will terminate NPA conflict within 6 years, which made GRP’s policy toward NPA unclear.

2.2. Human rights violations

Since 2001, more than 800 people are reported to have been victims of extrajudicial killing, and several people were disappeared (Amnesty International 2008). These people are activists, politicians, social/ NGO workers and journalists, who are suspected to relation of NPA or communists rebel groups. It has been happening for a long time but these cases have been increasing since 2001, when Arroyo administration started. GRP denies any relation between PNA (Philippines National Army) and PNP (Philippines National Police) and this series of killing, saying that these cases were from purges or the internal factional struggle of rebels. However, according to reports of Amnesty International, safe-conduct agreement of CARHRIHL, included list of individual member’s name and address of CPP/NPA and other related organizations, promised their safety, turned to an arrest warrant. It is highly suspected that PNA, PNP, hired assassins, ex-NPA combatants, and vigilantes used that information when they committed extrajudicial killings. In addition, vigilantes were established unofficially by PNA (not under control of PNA, and prohibited in 1987. But, they still exist and are influenced and supported by high rank government officials that show a tough stand against communist rebels. There is really very little chance that these vigilante or paramilitary killings will be punished. The number of missing or killed people has not decreased yet.

Certainly, these killings cannot stop NPA’s violence, but in some sense could increase it, as the government losses legitimacy. President Arroyo disavowed any involvement and cannot provide any effective way to solve this issue expeditiously. Although details of how the GRP and the group of people who killed cannot be found, at the very least, it is clear that the GRP cannot control them. These facts are enough to suspect GRP, and unhinge NPA’s trust in GRP, and continue their violent struggle.

2.3. Impact of poverty

Impact of poverty is caused by government policy, which has been emphasized by NPA. Since GRP had not implemented large scale land reform, poverty is still remaining especially among peasants of provinces. The structure that landlords dominate land has entrenched poverty in the country.

Although peasants sell harvest to earn hard cash, they have to sell them in lower place in the local market (Personal
interview 2006). In some cases, peasants work longer hours for less money on plantations. Unfortunately this system supports to provide the export of primary commodity. The poorest segment of the population is immobilized. 

Ramos presidency achieved average economic growth of roughly 4-5% until Asia economic crisis in 1997. According to research by National Statistic Coordination Board, the GINI coefficient had been declining from 0.4881 to 0.4814 for 3 years, from 1997 to 2000, which statistic shows that the society moved toward more equal income distribution. This is recognized to be brought by Ramos’ economic policy. However, does it mean that poverty in provinces is decreasing and people쳌fs life is improved? After WWII, GRP did not the dismantling of the plutocracy War and the implementation of a land reform therefore tiny percentage of people dominates system and structure, which formed the fixed society. Some soldiers of NPA claimed land reform in practical approach to GRP. There was a history that PKP received an amnesty and built a cooperative relation through Marcos’ agricultural reform, but large scale of reform has not been seen.

2.4. Decentralized authority, structure of NPA

Decentralized authority which is a characteristic of guerilla organization, makes peace process difficult Absence of founder, Jose Maria Sison and other leaders in the Philippines accelerates decentralized. Since 1987, they obliged to live in exile in Netherland.As a guerilla organization, NPA is spread all over the Philippines and conducting a guerrilla war. Even though negotiator of NPA reached agreement, it is suspected to produce effective results. For instance, on the one hand, Ramos and NPA had started negotiation since 1992 and successfully implemented in terms of past. On the other hands, Amnesty International reported that the way of collecting “revolution tax”, NPA had been resorting violence to civilians who had been falling behind in their payment in provinces. NPA can not control all of members because they had already been segmentalized and fighting “own war”. They are conducting workshop in communities of provinces but their interpretation of Maoism/ Marxism are different (Taden 2006). It means that there is no philosophy that can strongly support their action and solidarity. Decentralized authority also seems like their strategy to avoid to be captured by AFP. They learned from lesson of the 80s, AFP sent out many spies under Marcos administration. Because of that, they had been killing each other

2.5 Lack of confidence in peace process

Failure of process of confidence-building is highlighted. GRP lost NPAs trust because of changing policies toward NPA for long time, which gave an impact on NPA. Despite confidence-building needs long-time effort, pattern of shifting government쳌fs policy makes rebels impenetrable. Because the cabinet certainly changes every presidential
election, however, rebel group rarely change their structure of organization and the leaders therefore these memories as an organization remain them. NPA tends to think that peace agreement will break soon. And this patterned
thinking allows them to use as an excuse when NPA resort to violence.

2.6. Maoist principal

 Ideology is one of the primary sources of this conflict, and one of the reasons why they are continuously fighting. It makes conflict complicated because member of rebel tends to stick it, and defines member’s behaviors and attitude. Members are also expected to be who they are based on their principle. They are confirmed their identities from their violent action.

During Ramos administration, communist groups were legitimized, which encouraged them to participation of politics. It seemed like the success of the peace talks. However, revolutionaries loyal to Sison rose to fight for ideological identity, which stymied peace process. Rebel itself create spoilers on peace process. Inside group of people tended to emerge to argue going back to their principal. To rebels, it is anything more than compromising because their goal is “new democracy”, centering on peasants, through revolution. In addition, violence inside NPA  became a pressure to people who carry forward with negotiations. Even though Maoism adapted to the Philippines context and deformed its idea, NPA can never cease its violence. They called “great rectification” as known as “purge” which is to oppress people to confess by conducting violence. This dehumanizing process exists, which becomes pressure inside NPA and members are expected to practice or follow it as well. NPA try to contain betrayers who agree with peace process.

When NPA started fight for GRP because of grievance. They fight for poverty and recognition, so they believe in these their series of actions for people. But ironically the public feeling toward NPA has been disengaging from people because they thought NPA fell to the level of a gang. NPA has been threatening people’s lives by violent means. It seems like they are not really fighting for peasants anymore. They are fighting for fighting and struggling for struggling, which means the way to achieve their purpose become purpose itself. Without struggling, they cannot see their identities. It is not peculiar to NPA’s case to fight to confirm their raison d’être.

NPA has problems mainly inside their organization. As achieving revolutionary justice, members have been killing civilians until now by attacking public places or kidnapping civilians. But NPA has no power to completely stop them. Different interpretations justify their violent activities, but it is clear that the decentralized structure of the organization and their Maoist philosophies are major causes.

Conclusión

Throughout this analysis of the reasons that the peace process has been failing from both parities’ perspectives, the situation seems stalemate. Because not only GRP but also NPA face challenges from inside and outside, and these
challenges are deep rooted.

Effort of conflict mitigation can be found in civil society. For instance, the case of Peace Zone in Naga city is the one
of the good examples. However, most of these efforts are lead by NGOs. What this case of conflict needs is a strong ownership of GRP led mitigation. Although the conflict is deep rooted, as long as the GRP takes an initiative, like Ramos did, NPA goes back to the bargaining table. For a long time, unfortunately the Philippines has been considered geographically an important strategic location to U.S. If GRP cannot become immune from their influence, GRP has to find a new foreign diplomacy without military cooperation.  It is easily imagined that countries which are closely allied with US have dilemma between what the U.S. wants and what the government wants to do domestically. If GRP will follow direction of U.S. and subdue a rebel army, this will probably create new rebel groups. Because problems such as poverty in rural areas and human rights violations still remain.

Land reform takes a long time because ownership of land is closely linked to a political power. And it needs enough budgets because it has to go through many processes to proceed carefully. Quite a lot of politicians, their background are the landowner. Reform means that their influence in the provinces will be taken by someone. Once a landlord owns their land, there is no reason to give up them and distribute them someone. According to some reports, GRP is gradually progressing towards agrarian reform and trying to reduce poverty in rural areas (Reyes 2002). But can these small and slow reforms expect to bring difference in rural area? Until when can people wait for benefits of these processes?

Notas al final

Daiwa Institute of Research Ltd. (2005) Study group for a foresight of the medium- to long-term Philippines economy and policy, (Translate mine)

European Union, Council of the European Union. (20 December 2007). Council Decision of 20 December 2007 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001. Retrieved Oct 1^st 2008, from http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=search&docid=47a05f1b2&skip=0&query=the%20Council%20Regulation%20NPA

Hawes.G (1990) Theories of Peasant revolution. John Hopkins University press. World Politics, Vol. 42, No.2, pp261-298. Retrieved September 17^th 2008, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010466

INQUIRE (March 29 2008). CPP orders NPA to increase guerrilla fronts to 173. Retrieved Oct 4^th
2008, from http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20080329-127088/CPP-orders-NPA-to-increase-guerrilla-fronts-to-173

Lum. T, & Niksch. L.A. (January 10 2006). The Republic of the Philippines: Backgroud and U.S. Relations. Retrieved October 5^th 2008, from http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8129:1

National Statistical Coordination Board (2000) Retrieved Oct 1^st, from http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2000/ot_gini.asp

Project Ploughshares, (January 2008). Armed Conflicts Report. Retrieved September 25^th 2008, 

http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-PhilippinesN.html#Deaths

PRWC, (Philippines Revolution Web Central) (1998) Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines  Retrieved Oct 3^ª, from http://www.philippinerevolution.net/carhrihl/docu.shtml

REUTERS Foundation, Alert Net (April 9^th 2008) Communist Insurgency, Retrieved September 25^th 2008, from http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/PH_SEP.htm?v=in_detail

REUTERS Foundation, Alert Net (April 9^th 2008) Maoist rebels ambush Philippine troops, 8 wounded. Retrieved September 25^th 2008, from http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/MAN174959.htm

Reyes. C.M. (January 2002). Impact of Agrarian Reform on Poverty. Philippines Institute for Development study.
Retrieved Oct 1^st 2008, http://www.pids.gov.ph

Taden, E. (2006) Personal communication. University of the Philippines.

The Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Philippines, Inc. Chapter 2, Economy, p3, (Translate mine). Retrieved October 7^th 2008, from http://www.jccipi.com.ph/2-1(1).pdf

U.S Department of States,Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (December 30, 2004) Foreign Terrorist Organization Designations Table. Retrieved September 25^th 2008, from  http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/41055.pdf

Bio: Noriko Hashimoto holds an MA in International Peace Studies from the University for Peace.