Costa Rican Pineapples: Harvesting Abuse
Author: Montserrat Picado Campos
Since the 1980s, the Costa Rican government has encouraged the industrial production of pineapple (Echavarría & Prunier, 2020, p. 2). These efforts have resulted in the country being recognized as the leading pineapple exporter worldwide in 2020 (Ibid). This success is highly due to immigrants. In fact, there are barely any Costa Rican laborers working in the country’s pineapple plantations (Voorend & López, 2021, p. 9). These migrants, mostly of Nicaraguan origin, are often in Costa Rica under irregular migratory circumstances (MGCY, n.d.). This fact, as will be examined, paints them as cheap labor for plantation owners and makes them prone to labor right abuses (Ibid).
The present work will focus on these abuses and their intersection with various instruments from the International Labor Organization (ILO). To do this, it will firstly describe the situation in Costa Rica, highlighting the issues faced by migrants and the interests of various stakeholders (plantation workers, pineapple plantations, and the national government). Secondly, the essay will introduce various relevant ILO conventions and recommendations. It will point out the applicable sections within these instruments and will link them to events in Costa Rica. Thirdly, it will discuss the brief involvement that the ILO has had on this issue. Lastly, the work will make a series of recommendations.
Before diving into the main argumentation, however, two clarifications need to be made. Firstly, the list of abuses that will be examined here is not exhaustive. These issues have been chosen for discussion given their interconnectedness. Nonetheless, migrant workers face many more issues, which cannot be covered in this work given its limitations.[1] Secondly, the recommendations here made are not an exhaustive list, nor are they guaranteed to work. An analysis of the situation by experts with more complete knowledge and experience and with access to more advanced resources might yield more and better proposals for improving the situation of migrant plantation workers. The author solely desires to add a voice to this most important conversation.
As previously mentioned, most of the laborers working in pineapple plantations in Costa Rica are Nicaraguan immigrants. Most of the pineapple plantations in the country are located near the border with Nicaragua (Echavarría & Prunier, 2020, p. 2). The geography of the area facilitates the flow of these migrants (Ibid, p. 7-8). While there are several formal crossing points, there are many more informal ones, which are used daily by Nicaraguan nationals who come into Costa Rica for a day’s work (Ibid). As highlighted above, these migrants are often travelling under irregular conditions. Pineapple plantations take advantage of this, seeing in these migrants an opportunity to diminish costs by hiring them as cheap labor and denying them some basic labor rights (Voorend & López, 2021, p. 6).
The issues faced by these populations are wide-ranging. Firstly, migrants are often paid below minimum wage and are made to work long hours. The minimum wage in Costa Rica is 319.560 Costa Rican colones monthly (which becomes 286.006 colones after taxes) (Voorend & López, 2021, p. 8). These workers earn as little as 130.000 colones a month—less than half the minimum wage and below the extreme poverty line (Ibid; Echavarría & Prunier, 2020, p. 11). These low payments are particularly common among Nicaraguan migrants (Rodríguez, 2008). Additionally, these wages are obtained after long working hours. According to OXFAM, workers make about 0.75 Euros per hour, while working 12-hour (or longer) shifts (OXFAM in Rodríguez, 2008).
Secondly, as a consequence of these low wages, migrant workers are often denied the right to health. While Costa Rica offers social security, plantation owners often do not pay the contributions corresponding to migrant laborers, therefore denying them access to public health services (Rodríguez, 2008). This is particularly true for Nicaraguan workers. Between 2015 and 2021, 21% of Nicaraguan workers did not have access to social security services; by comparison, 4.1% of Costa Rican workers did not have access to these services (Voorend & López, 2021, p. 6).
The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated this situation. Social security clinics did not provide vaccinations to migrants in an irregular status, many of whom, as mentioned above, work in pineapple plantations (Chacón, 2021). What is more, even if a migrant could find a way to obtain a vaccine appointment (whether at a public or private clinic), employers usually denied them time off for the appointment (Ibid). Effectively, workers were made to choose between a day’s wage and their vaccine.
Additionally, the government required migrants who wished to work in pineapple and coffee plantations to show a negative PCR test. These tests cost about 100USD, two weeks salary for a migrant worker in a pineapple plantation (Ibid). Given these unaffordable prices, many workers have turned to irregular migration, re-starting the cycle of vulnerability and abuse. Consequently, pineapple plantations become foci of infection (Chacón, 2021). This lead to the widespread adoption of the belief that it was Nicaraguan workers who were to be blamed for the pandimic outbreak, which in turn gave rise to manifestations of racism and xenophobia against this population (Ibid).
Thirdly, workers are faced with the possibility of arbitrary/illegitimate firings, which prevents them from raising concerns about any of the aforementioned abuses (ILRF, 2011; Shah, 2020; MGCY, n.d.). These firings are closely related to the formation of unions. Plantation owners are known for taking actions to avoid the formation of workers’ unions among their employees (Rodríguez, 2008; ILRF, 2011).
If a worker is suspected of being involved in union-related activities, they will be “black-listed” and their employment will be subject to termination (Ibid). Moreover, even if employees are not suspected of unionizing behaviours, their position is still a weak one, with plantation owners often retaining workers only for a short time in a bid to diminish unionizing sentiments (ILRF, 2011).
Therefore, it becomes clear that workers, particularly migrants, face a number of issues when employed by pineapple plantations. Not only are these workers denied some of their basic labor rights, having to work extensive hours for innaporpriate salaries and high levels of job insecurity, but they cannot express their grievances through unions.
These workers “are exploited—arguably enslaved. They often lack the economic resources to go home, and get stuck in poor conditions” (MGCY, n.d.). The government and the pineapple plantations, moreover, hold an interest in maintaining these conditions. The owners of pineapple plantations claim that they are job-creating enterprises, hence solving labor-related structural issues present in the remote areas where plantations are located (Voorend & López, 2021, p. 9).
In other words, pineapple plantations claim to solve local underemployment by creating jobs. In fact, the government sees these companies as a path towards assisting these often impoverished communities (Echavarría & Prunier, 2020, p. 11). However, job creation implies certain expenses on the side of the employers: wages, social security contributions, training, among others. Irregular migrants do not have the right to speak against abuses to their rights, as they can be deported (MGCY, n.d.). As such, they represent an opportunity for plantation owners to continue their job-creating façade and maintain their production while reducing costs. Moreover, the government has no incentive to hold these companies accountable, given they are perceived as assisting the communities where they are located.
Nonetheless, the government is in violation of a number of its ILO commitments. Firstly, in terms of minimum wage and working hours, the government is violating its duties in relation to the Forced Labor Convention C029 (and its respective Protocol). The Protocol specificially mentions that measures must be taken to protect migrant workers “from possible abusive and fraudulent practices during the recruitrment and placement process” (ILO, 2014, art. 2.D). As will be discussed, the government has failed to take these actions, meaning that migrants are working in conditions the ILO considers as amounting to forced labor.
Secondly, the government is breaking its commitments to act against discrimination as outlined in Convention C111. This instrument requires states to “enable legislation which prohibits all discrimination and exclusion non any bases,” including nationality, in relation to employment (ILO, 1958). As has been discussed, Nicaraguan migrants are disproportionately affected by the abuses here outlined, which has led to limitations to the right to health, in turn exacerbating xenophobic sentiments against them.
At this point, it becomes relevant to highlight the ILO’S Migrant Workers Convention C143. This Convention specifically states that signatories have the responsibility to ensure that migrants are not subjected “to conditions contravening relevant international […] instruments” (ILO, 1975, art. 2.1). It is true that Costa Rica has not ratified this Convention (ILO, n.d.). However, the ILO has highlighted that its standards are:
“central to the dignity and rights of all migrant wokrers […] with no qualification as to their immigration status. In principle, unless otherwise stated, all international labour standards cover all workers irrespective of their nationality or immigration status” (ILO, 2011, p. 1).
Hence, even if Costa Rica has not adopted Convention C143, it is expected to uphold its other commitments for all laborers, including migrant workers, to the standards of the instruments it has ratified.
The ILO seems to share this opinion. Through its Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions and Recommendations, the ILO has made a number of direct requests on the subject. In 2016, the Committee expressed concerns about discrimination against Nicaraguan workers, in relation to Convention C111, articles 2 and 3 (CEACR, 2016). The Committee requested the government to provide information as to actions taken to protect migrant workers from discrimination (Ibid), but a report from the government has not yet been received (CEACR, n.d.).
In 2018, the Committee highlighted concerns about migrant workers’ rights in relation to hours and conditions of work, social protection, and trade union rights, as related to Convention C029 (and its Protocol), articles 1.1, 2.1, and 25 (CEACR, 2018). These concerns were repeated in 2019, making particular reference to article 4 of the Convention C029 (CEACR, 2019). Both the 2018 and the 2019 requests for information on how the government was preventing individuals from working under conditions that amounted to forced labor. The government has now responded to both requests, and these reports are under consideration (CEACR, n.d.).
While it is generally positive that the ILO is requesting these reports, it is doubtful whether this pressure will have a strong effect on the lives of migrant workers in Costa Rica. This is clear by the fact that the ILO had to express its same concerns in 2018 and 2019. More affirmative action needs to be taken within the country to accelerate the improvement of migrant laborers’ work conditions.
A possible route for the government to take would involve facilitating the process for migrants to obtain legal permits and to offer incentives for plantation owners to work with regularized workers. If the process of obtaining legal permissions to work is easier, it is more likely that migrants will pursue this, as it gives them increased job security.
Additionally, offering incentives to employers means that they would be more likely to want regularized workers, given these extra benefits. However, it is important that measures are taken to ensure this does not harm irregular migrants. Therefore, there should be a transition period where all irregular migrants are given the chance to go through a regularization process under the new shceme. If necessary, incentives must be offered to employees to guarantee that workers will be granted the time off. Moreover, policies must be implemented to make sure that plantations do not punish workers who want to become involved in this scheme.
Migrant workers are the backbone of Costa Rica’s pineapple success. The country must ensure their safety and dignity. Signing up to ILO conventions is not enough—these instruments must be implemented beyond the bare minimum. The government must ensure that migrants’ dignity and human rights are upheld.
End Notes
[1] For more information about the impact of pesticides on the rights of these migrants and on the environment, please consult the sources cited. Additionally, for a specific analysis on the situation of women migrants, please visit https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1086/605482.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A91b81a399d84954d20e930a0781bf07a&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1
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Author’s short bio
Montserrat is a Costa Rican national with a wide range of professional and educational experiences. She holds a Master of Arts in International Relations and Comparative Literature and a Master of Letters in Legal and Constitutional Studies from the University of St Andrews (Scotland) and a Master of Arts in International Law and Human Rights from the University of Peace (Costa Rica). She has focused her professional career in refugee protection and human rights, having worked in direct refugee assistance in Calais, France and in resettlement programs at the International Organization for Migration. Previously, she has also served at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Organization of American States, and the Embassy of Costa Rica to the United Kingdom.
